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Trojanized anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312/2.1.313 served from Cursor's extension marketplace

Am I affected?

  • The Claude Code extension (anthropic.claude-code) in Cursor is version 2.1.312 or 2.1.313
  • An SSH key commented svc-telemetry is authorized (macOS, Linux)Read-only checkgrep -qs svc-telemetry ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && echo "svc-telemetry key found"
  • Windows: same key; also check C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keysRead-only checkSelect-String svc-telemetry $HOME\.ssh\authorized_keys
  • The file ~/.config/.smt or ~/.config/.smtk exists

Do this now

  1. Upgrade Cursor's Claude Code extension to 2.1.314 or later
  2. Search authorized_keys fleet-wide for a key commented svc-telemetry
  3. Rotate secrets held in environment variables on exposed hosts

Show all 4 defender actions

What happened

On 29 Oct 2026, Cursor's marketplace served a trojanized Claude Code extension that planted an SSH backdoor.

Affects: Cursor users with the Claude Code extension on macOS or Windows

  • Cursor
  • Claude Code
  • macOS
  • Windows

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    Silent auto-update of a trusted first-party extension listing

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    Modified extension.js loader with SSH key implant, reverse tunnel and cron/LaunchAgent/Startup persistence

  3. Actor

    No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.

  4. Infrastructure

    • Single attacker VPS for HTTP beacon (8099/tcp) and reverse SSH; taken offline 30 Oct

    Last seen

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
extension-idanthropic[.]claude-code@2.1.312
extension-idanthropic[.]claude-code@2.1.313
ip134[.]209[.]82[.]225
urlhxxp://134[.]209[.]82[.]225:8099/beacon
sha256ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15
sha256fcbb327e38e61c4fec795e0d0591f52cd1014b813d20a5912104953c3a17c364
ssh-keySHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk
ssh-keySHA256:KOAU57+ZG6u3MG4WwzPzPX2O5YEe9qdOC1Bl+6MVyDQ
path~/.config/.smt
path~/.config/.smtk
filenamecom[.]apple[.]sysmond[.]plist
filenamesysmon[.]cmd
otherauthorized_keys comment: svc-telemetry

Defender actions

  1. Find Cursor installs that had 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 and upgrade to 2.1.314 or later
  2. Search authorized_keys fleet-wide for a key commented svc-telemetry
  3. Hunt for ~/.config/.smt, LaunchAgent com.apple.sysmond.plist, Startup sysmon.cmd and @reboot cron entries
  4. Rotate every secret whose environment variable name was present on exposed hosts

Summary

For about 11 hours on 29 Oct 2026, Cursor's marketplace served modified builds of Anthropic's official Claude Code extension under its real ID, reaching up to about 5,000 users. The loader collected host and git details, planted an attacker SSH key, turned on SSH, opened a reverse tunnel, set persistence and beaconed home. Microsoft's Marketplace, Open VSX and Anthropic's own systems were not affected.

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Notes

  • Also fits publisher-pipeline; filed here once to avoid double counting.
  • As of 10 Nov 2026, neither Cursor nor Anthropic has said how the marketplace access was gained.

Corrections

No corrections.

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