Trojanized anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312/2.1.313 served from Cursor's extension marketplace
- Taken downas of
- Moderate confidence
- Exposure 11 hours, 29 Oct 2026
- Reach Up to 5,000 users as of 1 Nov 2026
- Indicators (13): CSV, JSON
- Seen to
Am I affected?
- The Claude Code extension (anthropic.claude-code) in Cursor is version 2.1.312 or 2.1.313
- An SSH key commented svc-telemetry is authorized (macOS, Linux)Read-only check
grep -qs svc-telemetry ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && echo "svc-telemetry key found" - Windows: same key; also check C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keysRead-only check
Select-String svc-telemetry $HOME\.ssh\authorized_keys - The file ~/.config/.smt or ~/.config/.smtk exists
Do this now
- Upgrade Cursor's Claude Code extension to 2.1.314 or later
- Search authorized_keys fleet-wide for a key commented svc-telemetry
- Rotate secrets held in environment variables on exposed hosts
What happened
On 29 Oct 2026, Cursor's marketplace served a trojanized Claude Code extension that planted an SSH backdoor.
Affects: Cursor users with the Claude Code extension on macOS or Windows
- Cursor
- Claude Code
- macOS
- Windows
Attack chain
-
Lure
Silent auto-update of a trusted first-party extension listing
First seen
-
Artifact
Modified extension.js loader with SSH key implant, reverse tunnel and cron/LaunchAgent/Startup persistence
-
Actor
No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.
-
Infrastructure
- Single attacker VPS for HTTP beacon (8099/tcp) and reverse SSH; taken offline 30 Oct
Last seen
Timeline
- First seen
- Cursor reports
- OpenSourceMalware reports
- Help Net Security reports
- Last seen
- StepSecurity reports
- Status checked: Taken down
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| extension-id | anthropic[.]claude-code@2.1.312 | |
| extension-id | anthropic[.]claude-code@2.1.313 | |
| ip | 134[.]209[.]82[.]225 | |
| url | hxxp://134[.]209[.]82[.]225:8099/beacon | |
| sha256 | ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15 | |
| sha256 | fcbb327e38e61c4fec795e0d0591f52cd1014b813d20a5912104953c3a17c364 | |
| ssh-key | SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk | |
| ssh-key | SHA256:KOAU57+ZG6u3MG4WwzPzPX2O5YEe9qdOC1Bl+6MVyDQ | |
| path | ~/.config/.smt | |
| path | ~/.config/.smtk | |
| filename | com[.]apple[.]sysmond[.]plist | |
| filename | sysmon[.]cmd | |
| other | authorized_keys comment: svc-telemetry |
Defender actions
- Find Cursor installs that had 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 and upgrade to 2.1.314 or later
- Search authorized_keys fleet-wide for a key commented svc-telemetry
- Hunt for ~/.config/.smt, LaunchAgent com.apple.sysmond.plist, Startup sysmon.cmd and @reboot cron entries
- Rotate every secret whose environment variable name was present on exposed hosts
Summary
For about 11 hours on 29 Oct 2026, Cursor's marketplace served modified builds of Anthropic's official Claude Code extension under its real ID, reaching up to about 5,000 users. The loader collected host and git details, planted an attacker SSH key, turned on SSH, opened a reverse tunnel, set persistence and beaconed home. Microsoft's Marketplace, Open VSX and Anthropic's own systems were not affected.
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Notes
- Also fits publisher-pipeline; filed here once to avoid double counting.
- As of 10 Nov 2026, neither Cursor nor Anthropic has said how the marketplace access was gained.
Corrections
No corrections.
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