MaliciousCorgi: working AI-assistant extensions that send every opened file to China-hosted servers
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Moderate confidence
- Indicators (3): CSV, JSON
- Seen to
Do this now
- Remove both IDs and block the listed domain
- Treat repos and .env secrets opened while these were installed as exposed, and rotate them
- Use an allowlist for AI-assistant extensions
Indicators to check
Look for any of these on your machines or in your logs:
- extension-id
whensunset[.]chatgpt-china - extension-id
zhukunpeng[.]chat-moss
What happened
Two working ChatGPT-style coding assistants with about 1.5M combined installs uploaded the full contents of every opened file, along with edits, to remote servers. They could also run server-triggered harvesting of up to 50 workspace files, and they loaded analytics SDKs in hidden iframes to fingerprint users.
- VS Code Marketplace
Attack chain
-
Lure
Free Chinese-language ChatGPT coding assistant
First seen
-
Artifact
Functional extension with built-in source exfiltration
-
Actor
No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.
-
Infrastructure
- China-hosted collection server
Last seen
Timeline
- First seen
- BleepingComputer reports
- The Hacker News reports
- Last seen
- Status checked: Status unknown
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| extension-id | whensunset[.]chatgpt-china | |
| extension-id | zhukunpeng[.]chat-moss | |
| domain | aihao123[.]cn |
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Notes
- Both were listed at reporting time. The listing for whensunset[.]chatgpt-china returned 404 on 8 Nov 2026, but it is not in RemovedPackages.md, so we can't confirm whether it was removed.
Corrections
No corrections.
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