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MaliciousCorgi: working AI-assistant extensions that send every opened file to China-hosted servers

Do this now

  1. Remove both IDs and block the listed domain
  2. Treat repos and .env secrets opened while these were installed as exposed, and rotate them
  3. Use an allowlist for AI-assistant extensions

Indicators to check

Look for any of these on your machines or in your logs:

  • extension-idwhensunset[.]chatgpt-china
  • extension-idzhukunpeng[.]chat-moss

CSVJSONAll 3 indicators

What happened

Two working ChatGPT-style coding assistants with about 1.5M combined installs uploaded the full contents of every opened file, along with edits, to remote servers. They could also run server-triggered harvesting of up to 50 workspace files, and they loaded analytics SDKs in hidden iframes to fingerprint users.

  • VS Code Marketplace

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    Free Chinese-language ChatGPT coding assistant

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    Functional extension with built-in source exfiltration

  3. Actor

    No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.

  4. Infrastructure

    • China-hosted collection server

    Last seen

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
extension-idwhensunset[.]chatgpt-china
extension-idzhukunpeng[.]chat-moss
domainaihao123[.]cn

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Notes

  • Both were listed at reporting time. The listing for whensunset[.]chatgpt-china returned 404 on 8 Nov 2026, but it is not in RemovedPackages.md, so we can't confirm whether it was removed.

Corrections

No corrections.

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