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Optimizely Web project code altered to serve a crypto address swapper, card skimmer and iOS exploit kits

Am I affected?

  • Your site loads an Optimizely Web snippet whose Project JavaScript references 1688360[.]cc or uses atob(
  • Your CSP reports from 16 Nov show scripts loaded from, or data sent to, the loader domain
  • You opened an affected site on 16 Nov on an iPhone or iPad running iOS older than 18.7.3 (or 26.3)

Do this now

  1. Check Optimizely Project JavaScript and custom code for unknown scripts
  2. Rotate Optimizely users, API tokens and integration credentials
  3. Enforce a strict CSP script-src and connect-src

Show all 5 defender actions

What happened

On 16 Nov 2026, altered Optimizely Web snippets served wallet swappers, card skimmers and iOS exploits to visitors.

Affects: Sites using Optimizely Web, and their visitors on 16 Nov, especially on iPhone

  • Optimizely Web
  • Web
  • iOS and iPadOS

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    No lure. Visitors only had to open a page on an affected site: the code arrived inside the site's own Optimizely Web snippet. How the attacker got write access to the projects is not public; Optimizely says a vulnerability in its Experimentation product was exploited.

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    Malicious code added to the Project JavaScript of 188 Optimizely Web snippets. It loads track.js from the attacker's server (a crypto address swapper, with a card skimmer added at 13:43 UTC) and, on iPhones and iPads, an iOS exploit loader: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18.

  3. Actor

    No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.

  4. Infrastructure

    • Loader and exfiltration server 1688360[.]cc (track.js, card.php, hit.php)
    • iOS exploit routers 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu; Coruna telemetry on l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu
    • Fallback servers hard-coded in the iOS loader, je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu and ios-hack[.]icu
    • Earlier injector webshell[.]lol and SEO-panel host linkforge[.]cc (Report URI calls webshell[.]lol the same actor's injector)
    • Related, not proven: p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu and gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu share the exploit kit's certificates and IPs (Report URI)
    • Attacker wallets on eight chains; about $7,040 received by 19:25 UTC on 16 Nov (Report URI)

    Last seen

What the attacker installed afterwards

Timeline

  1. First seen
  2. Report URI reports
  3. Last seen
  4. Help Net Security reports
  5. Status checked: Taken down

None yet.

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
domain1688360[.]cc
domain5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu
domaineil786npto9u5bq[.]icu
domainl7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu
domainje4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu
domainq1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu
domainios-hack[.]icu
domainwebshell[.]lol
domainlinkforge[.]cc
ip136[.]113[.]106[.]136
ip34[.]96[.]213[.]201
ip34[.]87[.]36[.]58
urlhxxps://1688360[.]cc/track[.]js
urlhxxps://1688360[.]cc/card[.]php
urlhxxps://1688360[.]cc/hit[.]php
sha256814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f
sha256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40
otherBTC wallet 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
otherETH/EVM wallet 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
otherTRON wallet THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
otherSOL wallet FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
otherTON wallet UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
otherLTC wallet ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
otherBCH wallet qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
otherDOGE wallet DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5
otherPage globals window._k7 and window.__k7b

Defender actions

  1. Open every Optimizely project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code, and look for the loader domain, atob( and any script you did not write
  2. Review Optimizely users, API tokens and integrations with write access, and rotate their credentials
  3. Treat non-HttpOnly session cookies and card data typed into your own forms on 16 Nov 2026 as exposed
  4. Set a restrictive Content Security Policy: list only the hosts you need in script-src, restrict connect-src and avoid unsafe-eval. Start in Report-Only mode with reporting on
  5. Visitors: update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later, and check any crypto address pasted on an affected site on 16 Nov

Summary

On 16 Nov 2026 an attacker added code to the Project JavaScript of Optimizely Web projects, so Optimizely's own CDN served it to visitors of every affected site. Report URI found it in 188 of the 1,611 snippets it checked, belonging to 178 organisations. The code swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed cards typed into the sites' own forms, sent cookies and screenshots to the attacker, and pushed iOS exploit kits to iPhones and iPads. Optimizely says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation, which it has fixed. Most snippets were cleaned the same evening.

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Notes

  • Report URI names affected organisations including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, IKEA and Equifax, plus Optimizely's own site and login page. A listed site served the code; that does not mean the organisation's own systems were breached.
  • Exposure ends at Report URI's 21:52 UTC check, when one of the 188 snippets (TalkTalk) was still infected. Most were cleaned between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC. Optimizely says it has removed the injected code from affected projects.
  • Report URI links this to an earlier wave from 13 Nov that used the same injector through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts. Hudson Rock and researcher Kirk traced poisoned scripts on those services but have not shown a single operator or entry point.
  • Hudson Rock could not link the roughly $7,040 the wallets received to visitors of affected sites, and has not reproduced the later iOS stages (keychain, seed phrase and private key theft) that Kirk documented.
  • Report URI says this was not CDN cache poisoning. Hashes and indicators are as Report URI published them; we have not analysed the files ourselves.

Corrections

No corrections.

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