CampaignsFake interview / recruiter lure
REF9403: fake contractor in a community Slack sends trojanized Next.js shop 'test challenges'
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Moderate confidence
- Exposure Since 26 May 2026
- Indicators (4): CSV, JSON
- Seen to
Am I affected?
- You ran one of: shopping-platform-main.zip, next-ecommerce-private-main.zip, ecommerce-platform.zip, ecommerce-platform-main.zip, shopping-platform.rar, shop-main.zip, ecommerce-main.zip
- A downloaded project has serverValidation.js with a validation() function
- DNS or proxy logs show subdomains of rightwidth[.]dev
Do this now
- Run candidate projects in sandboxed containers without wallets or credentials
- Block rightwidth[.]dev and the listed IP
- Moderators: warn members about job offers sent by DM
What happened
A fake contractor in a community Slack sent developers backdoored Next.js shop test projects that install OtterCookie.
Affects: Freelance JavaScript and Next.js developers taking job tests from community Slack or Discord contacts
- Next.js
- npm
- Slack
- Windows
- macOS
Attack chain
-
Lure
Freelance job post in a community Slack, followed by a zipped 'test challenge'
First seen
-
Artifact
Zipped Next.js repos (for example shopping-platform-main.zip) with backdoored startup code
-
Actor
Contagious Interview, tracked as REF9403 (attribution: Elastic Security Labs; basis: code, behavior and infrastructure shared with OtterCookie)
-
Infrastructure
- rightwidth[.]dev subdomains for loader, upload and controller
- Two C2 IPs
Last seen
Timeline
- First seen
- Elastic Security Labs reports
- Last seen
- Status checked: Status unknown
- Correction
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| domain | controller[.]rightwidth[.]dev | |
| domain | upload[.]rightwidth[.]dev | |
| ip | 195[.]26[.]248[.]212 | |
| sha256 | 8e571d58794b9b44ae53c2c67bedef72c500e8adbb80aab7a5c263adcba55b1e |
Defender actions
- Moderators of community Slack and Discord spaces: warn members about job offers sent by DM
- Block rightwidth[.]dev and the listed IP
- Run candidate projects in sandboxed containers that hold no wallets or credentials
Summary
A persona advertising e-commerce contract work in a public community Slack moved candidates to DMs and sent backdoored copies of a public Next.js shop template. The code runs on npm run dev or npm start and delivers a four-stage OtterCookie chain: browser and wallet stealer, file stealer, Socket.IO RAT, and clipboard stealer.
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Corrections
- : First seen corrected from 18 Jul 2026 to 26 May 2026. 18 Jul is the date Elastic published; Elastic dates the first job post in the Slack to 26 May 2026.
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