CampaignsFake interview / recruiter lure
'Fake Font' assignment repos hiding JavaScript loaders as .woff2 files
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Low confidence
- Indicators (2): CSV, JSON
- Seen to
Do this now
- Flag font files in repos whose content is not a valid font
- Block the typosquat domain
- Hunt for ~/.npm/scoped_dir* directories created by node
Indicators
For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.
- domain1
- url1
What happened
In this variant, fintech and crypto recruiters sent about 17-19 assignment repos. Each repo's tasks.json executed JavaScript disguised as a web-font file. The chain ran from BeaverTail to an InvisibleFerret loader and backdoor, which steal wallets and credentials, and was staged on a domain impersonating Alchemy.
- VS Code
- GitHub
- Windows
- macOS
Attack chain
-
Lure
LinkedIn recruiter coding assessment (clone and open the repo)
First seen
-
Artifact
Repo whose .vscode/tasks.json runs a .woff2 file that is actually JavaScript
-
Actor
Not named. We name an actor only at Moderate confidence or above, when the evidence supports it.
-
Infrastructure
- Typosquatted Alchemy RPC domain registered 2026-01-16
- HTTP endpoint gated by a custom header
Last seen
Timeline
- First seen
- OpenSourceMalware reports
- Last seen
- Status checked: Status unknown
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| domain | eth-mainnet-alchemy[.]com | |
| url | hxxp://eth-mainnet-alchemy[.]com/api/service/token/f71d1d9b2de7d4ebf5f706a4b9cd4eb4 |
Confidence: Low
Something worth watching. Not a conclusion. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Notes
- Single community research source, so this is Low and the actor is null.
- The first-seen date is the C2 domain registration date.
Corrections
No corrections.
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