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CampaignsFake interview / recruiter lure

Assessment repos that autorun through VS Code tasks.json folderOpen

Do this now

  1. Enforce Workspace Trust and set task.allowAutomaticTasks to off by policy
  2. Hunt for node or curl whose parent process is Code Helper or code.exe
  3. Scan cloned repos for .vscode/tasks.json containing runOn folderOpen

Indicators

For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.

  • sha2561
  • domain1

CSVJSONAll 2 indicators

What happened

Fake CTOs and recruiters shared Git repos presented as hiring assessments. Each contained a hidden .vscode/tasks.json set to run on folder open, so trusting the workspace in VS Code was enough to pipe a remote script into Node. The script installed a JavaScript backdoor that beacons every few seconds.

  • VS Code
  • GitHub
  • GitLab
  • Bitbucket
  • LinkedIn
  • macOS

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    Technical assessment repo shared through LinkedIn

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    .vscode/tasks.json autorun task (curl piped to node, run under nohup)

  3. Actor

    Contagious Interview, DPRK-nexus (attribution: Jamf Threat Labs; basis: matching TTPs and payload chain)

  4. Infrastructure

    • Payloads staged on Vercel apps
    • ipify used to look up victim IP

    Last seen

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
sha256932a67816b10a34d05a2621836cdf7fbf0628bbfdf66ae605c5f23455de1e0bc
domainip-regions-check[.]vercel[.]app

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Notes

  • The first-seen date is month-level: Jamf only says December 2025.
  • The ip-regions-check domain comes from The Hacker News summary, not Jamf's IOC list.

Corrections

No corrections.

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