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CampaignsFake interview / recruiter lure

Void Dokkaebi interview repos that spread into the victim's own repositories

Do this now

  1. Search org repos for global['!'], global['_V'] and temp_auto_push.bat
  2. Enforce branch protection and signed commits, and block force-push
  3. Alert when node on a developer host calls the TronGrid or Aptos APIs

Indicators

For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.

  • ip4

CSVJSONAll 4 indicators

What happened

Interview repos run a folder-open task that infects the developer, then push the loader into the victim's own repos and hide it by rewriting git history. Trend Micro counted more than 750 infected repos, some belonging to real organizations. The payload is the DEV#POPPER Node RAT, with C2 configuration fetched from the Tron, Aptos and BSC blockchains.

  • VS Code
  • Node.js
  • GitHub
  • GitLab
  • Bitbucket
  • Windows
  • macOS
  • Linux

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    Fake job interview: clone and run a code assessment

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    .vscode/tasks.json autorun; global['!'] and global['_V'] loader markers; temp_auto_push.bat

  3. Actor

    Void Dokkaebi / Famous Chollima (attribution: Trend Micro; basis: DEV#POPPER RAT and overlap with the BeaverTail, OtterCookie and InvisibleFerret toolset)

  4. Infrastructure

    • Blockchain dead drops (TronGrid, Aptos, BSC APIs)
    • socket.io WebSocket C2

    Last seen

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
ip136[.]0[.]9[.]8
ip198[.]105[.]127[.]210
ip23[.]27[.]202[.]27
ip85[.]239[.]62[.]36

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Corrections

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