CampaignsFake interview / recruiter lure
Void Dokkaebi interview repos that spread into the victim's own repositories
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Moderate confidence
- Indicators (4): CSV, JSON
- Seen
Do this now
- Search org repos for global['!'], global['_V'] and temp_auto_push.bat
- Enforce branch protection and signed commits, and block force-push
- Alert when node on a developer host calls the TronGrid or Aptos APIs
What happened
Interview repos run a folder-open task that infects the developer, then push the loader into the victim's own repos and hide it by rewriting git history. Trend Micro counted more than 750 infected repos, some belonging to real organizations. The payload is the DEV#POPPER Node RAT, with C2 configuration fetched from the Tron, Aptos and BSC blockchains.
- VS Code
- Node.js
- GitHub
- GitLab
- Bitbucket
- Windows
- macOS
- Linux
Attack chain
-
Lure
Fake job interview: clone and run a code assessment
First seen
-
Artifact
.vscode/tasks.json autorun; global['!'] and global['_V'] loader markers; temp_auto_push.bat
-
Actor
Void Dokkaebi / Famous Chollima (attribution: Trend Micro; basis: DEV#POPPER RAT and overlap with the BeaverTail, OtterCookie and InvisibleFerret toolset)
-
Infrastructure
- Blockchain dead drops (TronGrid, Aptos, BSC APIs)
- socket.io WebSocket C2
Last seen
Timeline
- First seen
- Trend Micro reports
- Last seen
- Status checked: Status unknown
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| ip | 136[.]0[.]9[.]8 | |
| ip | 198[.]105[.]127[.]210 | |
| ip | 23[.]27[.]202[.]27 | |
| ip | 85[.]239[.]62[.]36 |
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Corrections
No corrections.
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