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CampaignsPaste and run

Lookalike Microsoft login domain impersonates a Czech company's IT department to deliver a ClickFix RAT

Do this now

  1. Disable the Run dialog for staff who don't need it, or alert on explorer.exe spawning powershell, cmd or mshta right after a browser visit
  2. Tell non-technical staff that IT will never ask them to paste a command to prove they are human
  3. Block microsoftofice[.]cz and kupujto[.]unas[.]cz (not the shared unas[.]cz host); monitor lookalikes of your own login domains

Indicators

For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.

  • domain3
  • ip2
  • sha2567

CSVJSONAll 12 indicators

What happened

A Microsoft lookalike domain hosted a Czech-language 'verify you are human' page styled as one company's IT department. It told staff to press Win+R, paste and run a command, which installed two UPX-packed PureBasic loaders named like Windows components. The loaders unpack batch scripts that act as a remote access trojan, taking commands from a small PHP panel.

  • Windows

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    Fake human-verification prompt in Czech, presented as the employer's IT department, asking the employee to paste and run a command in the Windows Run dialog

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    The employee pastes and runs a command in the Windows Run dialog, which fetches Windows_Repair.zip with two UPX-packed PureBasic loaders that unpack batch-script RAT components

    The victim was persuaded to paste and run a command. We don't publish the command text.

  3. Actor

    No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.

  4. Infrastructure

    • Delivery on a lookalike login subdomain (DigitalOcean)
    • Staging on a free-hosting subdomain (VSHosting)
    • PHP C2 panel (pages.php, name.html, comm.html, pages2.php)

What the attacker installed afterwards

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
domainmicrosoftofice[.]cz
domainlogin[.]microsoftofice[.]cz
domainkupujto[.]unas[.]cz
ip209[.]38[.]249[.]166
ip185[.]64[.]219[.]6
sha256bcd389ba3926c573a8002c2cc8cc8d07a38c346928d7322f5e080b5c2c447bee
sha25689faee1d3450c2e373f5f8ccd4736650fa23495c2fdaff0ec94654516fb04fcd
sha256ebb9192b3bcf2a921b3be719f82fb669157ea1929f74334208d4c0b5294941f9
sha256620a05b6220708d79b14b593cbce7eae9e6b4f2466c5da689f45a9841743bc75
sha2564fae98bcdc8d867b6ac399679fe801fe481284f760a3b23eda1488f75bf755ec
sha256cd571866ddd5400c028e11b6a1ec4704afd5afee31ea5476cc0d32e05a894378
sha2561b48af28a72548e086956f353e357d6097088c6509938cfcf9121bbdf27ab8b4

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Notes

  • Filed under paste-and-run (Option B, 16 Nov 2026); previously parked under other.
  • first_seen is the earliest certificate for the login subdomain (25 Nov 2025); the domain was registered in October 2025. Flare analyzed it in Q3 2026 and gives no last-observed date, so last_seen is empty.
  • Flare saw a command staged on a live panel during analysis but gives no date and no takedown, so status is unknown.
  • The targeted company is not named on purpose.
  • All seven hashes verified byte-exact against the raw Flare page (3 Nov 2026) on 16 Nov 2026. Flare's table also lists 7za.png, which it labels genuine 7-Zip 25.01; a legitimate tool, so not recorded.
  • Status re-checked 16 Nov 2026 against the Flare page (no update since 3 Nov 2026).

Corrections

No corrections.

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