Lookalike Microsoft login domain impersonates a Czech company's IT department to deliver a ClickFix RAT
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Moderate confidence
- Indicators (12): CSV, JSON
- Seen
Do this now
- Disable the Run dialog for staff who don't need it, or alert on explorer.exe spawning powershell, cmd or mshta right after a browser visit
- Tell non-technical staff that IT will never ask them to paste a command to prove they are human
- Block microsoftofice[.]cz and kupujto[.]unas[.]cz (not the shared unas[.]cz host); monitor lookalikes of your own login domains
Indicators
For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.
- domain3
- ip2
- sha2567
What happened
A Microsoft lookalike domain hosted a Czech-language 'verify you are human' page styled as one company's IT department. It told staff to press Win+R, paste and run a command, which installed two UPX-packed PureBasic loaders named like Windows components. The loaders unpack batch scripts that act as a remote access trojan, taking commands from a small PHP panel.
- Windows
Attack chain
-
Lure
Fake human-verification prompt in Czech, presented as the employer's IT department, asking the employee to paste and run a command in the Windows Run dialog
First seen
-
Artifact
The employee pastes and runs a command in the Windows Run dialog, which fetches Windows_Repair.zip with two UPX-packed PureBasic loaders that unpack batch-script RAT components
The victim was persuaded to paste and run a command. We don't publish the command text.
-
Actor
No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.
-
Infrastructure
- Delivery on a lookalike login subdomain (DigitalOcean)
- Staging on a free-hosting subdomain (VSHosting)
- PHP C2 panel (pages.php, name.html, comm.html, pages2.php)
What the attacker installed afterwards
Windows_Repair.zipLoader
bcd389ba3926c573a8002c2cc8cc8d07a38c346928d7322f5e080b5c2c447bee
RuntimeBroker.exe and 'Microsoft Aggregator SubHost.exe' (UPX-packed PureBasic loaders, packed and unpacked)RAT
89faee1d3450c2e373f5f8ccd4736650fa23495c2fdaff0ec94654516fb04fcd620a05b6220708d79b14b593cbce7eae9e6b4f2466c5da689f45a9841743bc75ebb9192b3bcf2a921b3be719f82fb669157ea1929f74334208d4c0b5294941f94fae98bcdc8d867b6ac399679fe801fe481284f760a3b23eda1488f75bf755ec
SubHost.lnk and finish.vbs (persistence and launch)Loader
cd571866ddd5400c028e11b6a1ec4704afd5afee31ea5476cc0d32e05a8943781b48af28a72548e086956f353e357d6097088c6509938cfcf9121bbdf27ab8b4
Timeline
- First seen
- Flare reports
- Status checked: Status unknown
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| domain | microsoftofice[.]cz | |
| domain | login[.]microsoftofice[.]cz | |
| domain | kupujto[.]unas[.]cz | |
| ip | 209[.]38[.]249[.]166 | |
| ip | 185[.]64[.]219[.]6 | |
| sha256 | bcd389ba3926c573a8002c2cc8cc8d07a38c346928d7322f5e080b5c2c447bee | |
| sha256 | 89faee1d3450c2e373f5f8ccd4736650fa23495c2fdaff0ec94654516fb04fcd | |
| sha256 | ebb9192b3bcf2a921b3be719f82fb669157ea1929f74334208d4c0b5294941f9 | |
| sha256 | 620a05b6220708d79b14b593cbce7eae9e6b4f2466c5da689f45a9841743bc75 | |
| sha256 | 4fae98bcdc8d867b6ac399679fe801fe481284f760a3b23eda1488f75bf755ec | |
| sha256 | cd571866ddd5400c028e11b6a1ec4704afd5afee31ea5476cc0d32e05a894378 | |
| sha256 | 1b48af28a72548e086956f353e357d6097088c6509938cfcf9121bbdf27ab8b4 |
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Notes
- Filed under paste-and-run (Option B, 16 Nov 2026); previously parked under other.
- first_seen is the earliest certificate for the login subdomain (25 Nov 2025); the domain was registered in October 2025. Flare analyzed it in Q3 2026 and gives no last-observed date, so last_seen is empty.
- Flare saw a command staged on a live panel during analysis but gives no date and no takedown, so status is unknown.
- The targeted company is not named on purpose.
- All seven hashes verified byte-exact against the raw Flare page (3 Nov 2026) on 16 Nov 2026. Flare's table also lists 7za.png, which it labels genuine 7-Zip 25.01; a legitimate tool, so not recorded.
- Status re-checked 16 Nov 2026 against the Flare page (no update since 3 Nov 2026).
Corrections
No corrections.
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