TerminalFix: fake CAPTCHA tells visitors to paste a command into Windows Terminal, leading to a reverse tunnel into the network
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Moderate confidence
- Indicators (14): CSV, JSON
- Seen
Do this now
- Turn on the Windows Terminal multi-line paste warning and PowerShell script block logging; use Constrained Language Mode for standard users
- Alert when LockScreenContentServer.exe runs from anywhere other than C:\Windows\SystemApps
- Tell staff that a real CAPTCHA never asks them to run anything
Indicators
For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.
- domain3
- sha25611
What happened
A fake Cloudflare Turnstile check on compromised websites told visitors to paste a command into Windows Terminal or PowerShell. The command unpacked a ZIP, sideloaded a malicious DLL through a genuine Windows binary and pulled a payload hidden in PNG pixels. The end result is a Python reverse tunnel over port 443 that relays arbitrary TCP connections, which Microsoft says turns the PC into a stepping stone into the network.
- Web
- Windows
Attack chain
-
Lure
Fake 'verify you are human' Cloudflare-style check on compromised websites
First seen
-
Artifact
The visitor pastes and runs a copied command in Windows Terminal or PowerShell
The victim was persuaded to paste and run a command. We don't publish the command text.
-
Actor
No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.
-
Infrastructure
- Reverse tunnel C2 over TLS 443 upgraded to WebSocket
- Steganography payload host
- Failover delivery domain
Last seen
What the attacker installed afterwards
verify_pkg.zip dropped to ProgramData with a launcher batch fileLoader
18c2090e8a0ae0568af9b87e59eaf8270f23d2909600ed9db91a9444fd8b278f
dui70.dll variants sideloaded by a genuine Windows binary (nine hashes)Loader
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
client.py reverse tunnelTunnel
b8d107800403b9197e5b7609ceacd8e4cac1b0f9a1d156e6dacd6c3f7794b36a
Timeline
- First seen
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports
- Last seen
- Malwarebytes reports
- Status checked: Status unknown
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| domain | gitnow[.]dev | |
| domain | bestsocialmedianewspapper[.]com | |
| domain | offlineupdater[.]com | |
| sha256 | 18c2090e8a0ae0568af9b87e59eaf8270f23d2909600ed9db91a9444fd8b278f | |
| sha256 | b8d107800403b9197e5b7609ceacd8e4cac1b0f9a1d156e6dacd6c3f7794b36a | |
| sha256 | ba77feed86bcda49308746421bdc684a432dd5d68c363975b2a3c6831bda3f07 | |
| sha256 | 026478003fe354134c03acf6890e7d3b153ba08a836eca42350db48f213872ab | |
| sha256 | 032b529fac61e550f5dc9489686f519b82d64625fa05a8d9ecf8ba8be9b2ad22 | |
| sha256 | df8221a933b38284ebdcb8bffc2df62123c9f5b5f421dd0b070e13e668b3eabf | |
| sha256 | eb1b4be34d05b394fb74efdeb95faecd1d1963be6ecc1b9db2b4757b491f01f0 | |
| sha256 | 5d43abf5c36ea203176d3300ff14af27b4be81810ad2679b3a62b255e3d6e1c8 | |
| sha256 | 9a7b4dcd51d9251c177d323d6aaecdfc86674f69bc1af048dc872926d22aaa24 | |
| sha256 | 342df92235c9dec81203b837addaa38bb85b64b4a48fe71b5303ca86d991991e | |
| sha256 | ededeacf30e493dd632d477fe770ba419aa2848f685ea049381a0a8d2cc3e84d |
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Notes
- Microsoft names no actor and gives no activity dates, so first_seen and last_seen are the report date.
- Microsoft's IOC table lists exactly 11 unique sha256 (verify_pkg.zip, client.py, nine dui70.dll); all 11 are here, verified byte-exact against the raw Microsoft page on 16 Nov 2026. Malwarebytes publishes no hashes.
- LockScreenContentServer.exe is a genuine Windows binary abused for sideloading; it isn't hashed. The compromised sites that hosted the lure are victims and aren't listed.
- Status re-checked 16 Nov 2026 against the Microsoft page (no update since 29 Aug 2026) and the Malwarebytes page; no takedown reported, so status stays unknown.
Corrections
No corrections.
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