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TerminalFix: fake CAPTCHA tells visitors to paste a command into Windows Terminal, leading to a reverse tunnel into the network

Do this now

  1. Turn on the Windows Terminal multi-line paste warning and PowerShell script block logging; use Constrained Language Mode for standard users
  2. Alert when LockScreenContentServer.exe runs from anywhere other than C:\Windows\SystemApps
  3. Tell staff that a real CAPTCHA never asks them to run anything

Indicators

For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.

  • domain3
  • sha25611

CSVJSONAll 14 indicators

What happened

A fake Cloudflare Turnstile check on compromised websites told visitors to paste a command into Windows Terminal or PowerShell. The command unpacked a ZIP, sideloaded a malicious DLL through a genuine Windows binary and pulled a payload hidden in PNG pixels. The end result is a Python reverse tunnel over port 443 that relays arbitrary TCP connections, which Microsoft says turns the PC into a stepping stone into the network.

  • Web
  • Windows

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    Fake 'verify you are human' Cloudflare-style check on compromised websites

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    The visitor pastes and runs a copied command in Windows Terminal or PowerShell

    The victim was persuaded to paste and run a command. We don't publish the command text.

  3. Actor

    No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.

  4. Infrastructure

    • Reverse tunnel C2 over TLS 443 upgraded to WebSocket
    • Steganography payload host
    • Failover delivery domain

    Last seen

What the attacker installed afterwards

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
domaingitnow[.]dev
domainbestsocialmedianewspapper[.]com
domainofflineupdater[.]com
sha25618c2090e8a0ae0568af9b87e59eaf8270f23d2909600ed9db91a9444fd8b278f
sha256b8d107800403b9197e5b7609ceacd8e4cac1b0f9a1d156e6dacd6c3f7794b36a
sha256ba77feed86bcda49308746421bdc684a432dd5d68c363975b2a3c6831bda3f07
sha256026478003fe354134c03acf6890e7d3b153ba08a836eca42350db48f213872ab
sha256032b529fac61e550f5dc9489686f519b82d64625fa05a8d9ecf8ba8be9b2ad22
sha256df8221a933b38284ebdcb8bffc2df62123c9f5b5f421dd0b070e13e668b3eabf
sha256eb1b4be34d05b394fb74efdeb95faecd1d1963be6ecc1b9db2b4757b491f01f0
sha2565d43abf5c36ea203176d3300ff14af27b4be81810ad2679b3a62b255e3d6e1c8
sha2569a7b4dcd51d9251c177d323d6aaecdfc86674f69bc1af048dc872926d22aaa24
sha256342df92235c9dec81203b837addaa38bb85b64b4a48fe71b5303ca86d991991e
sha256ededeacf30e493dd632d477fe770ba419aa2848f685ea049381a0a8d2cc3e84d

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Notes

  • Microsoft names no actor and gives no activity dates, so first_seen and last_seen are the report date.
  • Microsoft's IOC table lists exactly 11 unique sha256 (verify_pkg.zip, client.py, nine dui70.dll); all 11 are here, verified byte-exact against the raw Microsoft page on 16 Nov 2026. Malwarebytes publishes no hashes.
  • LockScreenContentServer.exe is a genuine Windows binary abused for sideloading; it isn't hashed. The compromised sites that hosted the lure are victims and aren't listed.
  • Status re-checked 16 Nov 2026 against the Microsoft page (no update since 29 Aug 2026) and the Malwarebytes page; no takedown reported, so status stays unknown.

Corrections

No corrections.

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