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LiteLLM 1.107.0: malicious PyPI wheels and Docker images via a hijacked release workflow

Am I affected?

  • litellm 1.107.0 is installedRead-only checkfind / -type d -name "litellm-1.107.0.dist-info" 2>/dev/null
  • A cook.pth file is in site-packagesRead-only checkfind / -name cook.pth -path "*site-packages*" 2>/dev/null
  • The stealer's marker files existRead-only checkls -la /tmp/.pc_once_72129118c59f5636c0bb /tmp/remote_code_loader.lock

Do this now

  1. Look for new .pth or sitecustomize.py files in site-packages
  2. Rebuild container images pulled on 21 Oct 2026
  3. Pin container images by digest, not by tag

What happened

On 21 Oct 2026, a hijacked release workflow shipped litellm 1.107.0 and its Docker images with a credential stealer.

Affects: Python developers, CI runners and hosts using litellm 1.107.0 or LiteLLM latest images

  • PyPI
  • Docker Hub
  • GitHub Actions

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    None; leaked secret. Users trusted official releases and 'latest' image tags.

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    litellm 1.107.0 (cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py); Docker 1.107.0 and latest/main tags

  3. Actor

    No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.

  4. Infrastructure

    • Lookalike GitHub repo for build source
    • GitHub dead-drop repo
    • Attacker domains

    Last seen

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
packagelitellm==1.107.0
domainlitellm[.]dev
repositorygithub[.]com/letters9813/pythonclient-test
ip168[.]100[.]8[.]57

Defender actions

  1. Look for new *.pth or sitecustomize.py files in site-packages; rebuild images pulled on 21 Oct 2026
  2. Pin container images by digest, not by tag
  3. Enforce revocation of leaked API keys found by secret scanning

Summary

A master key committed to a project repo in May was never revoked. In October it was used against an internal API that returned an org owner's GitHub token. The attacker exfiltrated CI secrets, bypassed branch protection and pointed the release workflow at a lookalike repo. All 1.107.0 wheels and the official Docker images, including latest tags, carried a .pth credential stealer; PyPI quarantined the release within two hours.

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Notes

  • Separate from teampcp-litellm-1-82-pypi-compromise (Mar 2026). No social-engineering lure.

Corrections

No corrections.

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