CampaignsPublisher / pipeline compromise
LiteLLM 1.107.0: malicious PyPI wheels and Docker images via a hijacked release workflow
- Taken downas of
- Moderate confidence
- Exposure 3 hours, 21 Oct 2026
- Reach About 49,000 PyPI downloads as of 21 Oct 2026
- Indicators (4): CSV, JSON
- Seen to
Am I affected?
- litellm 1.107.0 is installedRead-only check
find / -type d -name "litellm-1.107.0.dist-info" 2>/dev/null - A cook.pth file is in site-packagesRead-only check
find / -name cook.pth -path "*site-packages*" 2>/dev/null - The stealer's marker files existRead-only check
ls -la /tmp/.pc_once_72129118c59f5636c0bb /tmp/remote_code_loader.lock
Do this now
- Look for new .pth or sitecustomize.py files in site-packages
- Rebuild container images pulled on 21 Oct 2026
- Pin container images by digest, not by tag
What happened
On 21 Oct 2026, a hijacked release workflow shipped litellm 1.107.0 and its Docker images with a credential stealer.
Affects: Python developers, CI runners and hosts using litellm 1.107.0 or LiteLLM latest images
- PyPI
- Docker Hub
- GitHub Actions
Attack chain
-
Lure
None; leaked secret. Users trusted official releases and 'latest' image tags.
First seen
-
Artifact
litellm 1.107.0 (cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py); Docker 1.107.0 and latest/main tags
-
Actor
No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.
-
Infrastructure
- Lookalike GitHub repo for build source
- GitHub dead-drop repo
- Attacker domains
Last seen
Timeline
- First seen
- StepSecurity reports
- Last seen
- Status checked: Taken down
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| package | litellm==1.107.0 | |
| domain | litellm[.]dev | |
| repository | github[.]com/letters9813/pythonclient-test | |
| ip | 168[.]100[.]8[.]57 |
Defender actions
- Look for new *.pth or sitecustomize.py files in site-packages; rebuild images pulled on 21 Oct 2026
- Pin container images by digest, not by tag
- Enforce revocation of leaked API keys found by secret scanning
Summary
A master key committed to a project repo in May was never revoked. In October it was used against an internal API that returned an org owner's GitHub token. The attacker exfiltrated CI secrets, bypassed branch protection and pointed the release workflow at a lookalike repo. All 1.107.0 wheels and the official Docker images, including latest tags, carried a .pth credential stealer; PyPI quarantined the release within two hours.
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Notes
- Separate from teampcp-litellm-1-82-pypi-compromise (Mar 2026). No social-engineering lure.
Corrections
No corrections.
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