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GhostAction 2026: fake 'security audit' workflows via hijacked accounts, plus GitHub device-flow phishing

Am I affected?

  • Your orgs have new security-audit.yml, github_actions_security.yml or security-check.yml workflows
  • Commit history shows "Add security audit workflow" or "Trigger security scan"
  • A repo has public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 and a .vscode/tasks.json that runs on folderOpen
  • A crontab line ends in #ghc2Read-only checkcrontab -l | grep ghc2

Do this now

  1. Revoke unexpected OAuth app grants; rotate PATs and repo secrets
  2. Protect default branches and use phishing-resistant MFA
  3. Search for new security-audit.yml or github_actions_security.yml workflows

Show all 4 defender actions

What happened

Since 31 Aug 2026, an operator with stolen GitHub tokens has pushed fake security workflows to steal CI secrets.

Affects: GitHub orgs and maintainers with stolen tokens, and VS Code users opening cloned repos

  • VS Code
  • GitHub
  • GitHub Actions

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    Fake GitHub 'new sign-in' security alert leading to an adversary-in-the-middle page that silently authorizes an OAuth app

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    security-audit.yml and github_actions_security.yml workflows; fake .woff2 stealer launched by .vscode/tasks.json

  3. Actor

    No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.

  4. Infrastructure

    • Phishing domain registered 9 Oct 2026
    • Exfil/C2 IP on ports 80/3000/8080
    • Malicious OAuth app

    Last seen

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
domainmy-github[.]com
ip193[.]32[.]204[.]199
ip45[.]139[.]104[.]115
ip170[.]39[.]218[.]2
domainbold-dhawan[.]45-139-104-115[.]plesk[.]page
filenamesecurity-audit[.]yml
filenamegithub_actions_security[.]yml
filenamefa-solid-400[.]woff2

Defender actions

  1. Search orgs for new security-audit.yml, github_actions_security.yml or security-check.yml workflows and for tasks.json with runOn folderOpen
  2. Revoke unexpected OAuth app grants, especially any with workflow scope; rotate PATs and repo secrets
  3. Protect default branches and use phishing-resistant MFA
  4. Block the listed IPs and domain

Summary

With stolen tokens and credentials, the operator pushed fake security workflows straight to default branches to send CI secrets to a hardcoded IP. Activity grew from hundreds of repos in Aug-Sep to about 72k commits across about 23k repos between 13 and 21 Oct. In October the operator added a lookalike-GitHub phishing kit that relays password and 2FA and approves an OAuth device flow, and a stealer disguised as a font file that runs from a VS Code tasks.json.

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Notes

  • The phishing lure comes from one source (OpenSourceMalware via THN). GitGuardian believes GhostAction reused a public launcher and sees no operator link to PolinRider.
  • GitGuardian reported on 27 Oct 2026 that GitHub's workflow hold stopped every workflow payload it found in the 13 to 21 Oct wave. About 1,400 of the roughly 1,800 accounts used had already been used in the 8 Oct wave. As of 10 Nov 2026, no malicious npm or PyPI releases have been tied to the stolen tokens.

Corrections

No corrections.

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