CampaignsPublisher / pipeline compromise
GhostAction 2026: fake 'security audit' workflows via hijacked accounts, plus GitHub device-flow phishing
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Moderate confidence
- Exposure Since 31 Aug 2026
- Reach 22,964 repositories targeted as of 27 Oct 2026
- Indicators (8): CSV, JSON
- Seen to
Am I affected?
- Your orgs have new security-audit.yml, github_actions_security.yml or security-check.yml workflows
- Commit history shows "Add security audit workflow" or "Trigger security scan"
- A repo has public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 and a .vscode/tasks.json that runs on folderOpen
- A crontab line ends in #ghc2Read-only check
crontab -l | grep ghc2
Do this now
- Revoke unexpected OAuth app grants; rotate PATs and repo secrets
- Protect default branches and use phishing-resistant MFA
- Search for new security-audit.yml or github_actions_security.yml workflows
What happened
Since 31 Aug 2026, an operator with stolen GitHub tokens has pushed fake security workflows to steal CI secrets.
Affects: GitHub orgs and maintainers with stolen tokens, and VS Code users opening cloned repos
- VS Code
- GitHub
- GitHub Actions
Attack chain
-
Lure
Fake GitHub 'new sign-in' security alert leading to an adversary-in-the-middle page that silently authorizes an OAuth app
First seen
-
Artifact
security-audit.yml and github_actions_security.yml workflows; fake .woff2 stealer launched by .vscode/tasks.json
-
Actor
No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.
-
Infrastructure
- Phishing domain registered 9 Oct 2026
- Exfil/C2 IP on ports 80/3000/8080
- Malicious OAuth app
Last seen
Timeline
- First seen
- StepSecurity reports
- The Hacker News reports
- GitGuardian reports
- GitGuardian reports
- Last seen
- Status checked: Status unknown
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| domain | my-github[.]com | |
| ip | 193[.]32[.]204[.]199 | |
| ip | 45[.]139[.]104[.]115 | |
| ip | 170[.]39[.]218[.]2 | |
| domain | bold-dhawan[.]45-139-104-115[.]plesk[.]page | |
| filename | security-audit[.]yml | |
| filename | github_actions_security[.]yml | |
| filename | fa-solid-400[.]woff2 |
Defender actions
- Search orgs for new security-audit.yml, github_actions_security.yml or security-check.yml workflows and for tasks.json with runOn folderOpen
- Revoke unexpected OAuth app grants, especially any with workflow scope; rotate PATs and repo secrets
- Protect default branches and use phishing-resistant MFA
- Block the listed IPs and domain
Summary
With stolen tokens and credentials, the operator pushed fake security workflows straight to default branches to send CI secrets to a hardcoded IP. Activity grew from hundreds of repos in Aug-Sep to about 72k commits across about 23k repos between 13 and 21 Oct. In October the operator added a lookalike-GitHub phishing kit that relays password and 2FA and approves an OAuth device flow, and a stealer disguised as a font file that runs from a VS Code tasks.json.
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Notes
- The phishing lure comes from one source (OpenSourceMalware via THN). GitGuardian believes GhostAction reused a public launcher and sees no operator link to PolinRider.
- GitGuardian reported on 27 Oct 2026 that GitHub's workflow hold stopped every workflow payload it found in the 13 to 21 Oct wave. About 1,400 of the roughly 1,800 accounts used had already been used in the 8 Oct wave. As of 10 Nov 2026, no malicious npm or PyPI releases have been tied to the stolen tokens.
Corrections
No corrections.
See the corrections policy. Spotted an error? Tell us.