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OVHcloud CLI GitHub release binaries and checksums swapped after an IDE-extension compromise

Am I affected?

  • Build info shows v0.15.1-0.20261013083505-5ead8ef9b43dRead-only checkgo version -m $(which ovhcloud) | head -5
  • Any /tmp/envchecker-* directory existsRead-only checkls -d /tmp/envchecker-*

Do this now

  1. Verify release attestations, or pin hashes from a separate channel
  2. Turn on GitHub immutable releases
  3. Rotate secrets on hosts that downloaded ovhcloud-cli on 19 Oct 2026

What happened

On 19 Oct 2026, ovhcloud-cli GitHub release binaries were swapped for a credential stealer, some with matching checksums.

Affects: Developers and CI pipelines that downloaded ovhcloud-cli 0.11.0 to 0.15.0 on 19 Oct

  • VS Code
  • Open VSX
  • GitHub Releases

Attack chain

  1. Lure

    Developer installed a malicious color-picker VS Code extension, which gave persistent access to their GitHub account

    First seen

  2. Artifact

    Replaced release assets and checksums.txt for ovhcloud-cli 0.11.0-0.15.0

  3. Actor

    GlassWorm operators (attribution: StepSecurity; basis: same Solana dead-drop wallet as earlier GlassWorm activity, extension-based initial access and matching loader TTPs)

  4. Infrastructure

    • Exfil endpoint
    • Solana dead-drop wallet
    • Force-pushed loader repos

    Last seen

Indicators

CSVJSON

All values are defanged (how to read them).

TypeValueCopy
urlhxxp://45[.]32[.]148[.]174/upload
ip162[.]33[.]177[.]177
sha25643df42fd79f6f81e530892b54634598770d6e496796a863c596e616bcb3fec70
extension-idcolor-picker-universal@2.8.91

Defender actions

  1. Verify release signatures or attestations, or pin hashes from a channel other than a checksums file shipped next to the binaries
  2. Turn on GitHub immutable releases
  3. Rotate secrets on hosts that downloaded ovhcloud-cli on 19 Oct 2026, and hunt for the extension

Summary

A contributor's GitHub account was used to replace binaries on five ovhcloud-cli releases with a credential stealer for about 94 minutes. On three releases the checksums file was replaced too, so the hashes matched. StepSecurity traces the access to a Node backdoor from a malicious VS Code extension the developer installed a year earlier. A customer's CI caught the swap because it pinned hashes separately.

Confidence: Moderate

Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.

Sources

Notes

  • The extension ID is given as reported, without its publisher prefix. The BleepingComputer date is approximate.

Corrections

No corrections.

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