Storm-1811: email bombing, then a fake IT helpdesk on Teams or by phone talks staff into a Quick Assist session
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Moderate confidence
- Indicators (23): CSV, JSON
- Seen to
Do this now
- Restrict Microsoft Teams external access to an allow-list of partner domains, so a new onmicrosoft tenant can't chat with staff
- Remove or block Quick Assist where it isn't used, and allow only your approved remote support tool by application control
- Tell staff the helpdesk never starts a remote session from an unsolicited call or chat; they call back on the number they already know
- Alert on external Teams chats whose display name contains 'Help Desk' or 'IT Support', especially right after an email flood
Indicators
For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.
- display-name4
- tenant-domain5
- domain6
- sha2568
What happened
The attacker signs an employee's address up to thousands of mailing lists, then contacts them as the IT helpdesk, by phone or from an external Microsoft Teams tenant, offering to fix the flood. The employee is talked into starting Quick Assist or installing a remote support tool. The attacker then drops loaders and remote tools, steals credentials and, in Microsoft's cases, deployed Black Basta ransomware.
- Microsoft Teams
- Phone
- Windows
Attack chain
-
Lure
Email flood, then an unsolicited call or external Teams chat from 'Help Desk' or 'IT Support' offering to stop it
First seen
-
Artifact
The employee starts a Quick Assist session (or installs AnyDesk or another remote tool) and hands control to the caller
Legitimate software
Quick Assist, AnyDesk and Microsoft Teams are legitimate software and are not malware. In this campaign the attacker talked the victim into using them; the malicious part is the session the victim granted and what the attacker installed afterwards.
-
Actor
Storm-1811
-
Infrastructure
- External Microsoft 365 tenants named like helpdesk or spam services
- phone, number withheld
- Payload domains used for batch and ZIP downloads
- Cobalt Strike C2 domains
Last seen
What the attacker installed afterwards
Batch and ZIP payloads fetched with cURL after the session (Microsoft, 15 May 2024)Loader
71d50b74f81d27feefbc2bc0f631b0ed7fcdf88b1abbd6d104e66638993786f80f9156f91c387e7781603ed716dcdc3f5342ece96e155115708b1662b0f9b4d01ad05a4a849d7ed09e2efb38f5424523651baf3326b5f95e05f6726f564ccc3093058bd5fe5f046e298e1d3655274ae4c08f07a8b6876e61629ae4a0b510a2f71cb1864314262e71de1565e198193877ef83e98823a7da81eb3d59894b5a4cfb
SafeStore.dll credential harvester (Rapid7)Stealer
3b7e06f1ccaa207dc331afd6f91e284fec4b826c3c427dffd0432fdc48d55176
Zbot, SyncSuite.exe (Rapid7)Loader
db34e255aa4d9f4e54461571469b9dd53e49feed3d238b6cfb49082de0afb1e4
DarkGate, SafeFilter.exe (Rapid7)RAT
ef28a572cda7319047fbc918d60f71c124a038cd18a02000c7ab413677c5c161
Qakbot, Cobalt Strike, SystemBCLoader
ScreenConnect and NetSupport Manager, configured by the attackerRemote tool
Black BastaRansomware
Timeline
- First seen
- CISA, FBI, HHS, MS-ISAC reports
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports
- ReliaQuest reports
- Rapid7 reports
- Rapid7 reports
- Last seen
- Sophos reports
- Status checked: Status unknown
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| display-name | Help Desk | |
| display-name | Help Desk IT | |
| display-name | Help Desk Support | |
| display-name | IT Support | |
| tenant-domain | 1helpyou[.]onmicrosoft[.]com | |
| tenant-domain | supporthelper[.]onmicrosoft[.]com | |
| tenant-domain | servicedeskadmin[.]onmicrosoft[.]com | |
| tenant-domain | spamshieldmanager[.]onmicrosoft[.]com | |
| tenant-domain | securityfusion[.]onmicrosoft[.]com | |
| domain | upd7a[.]com | |
| domain | upd7[.]com | |
| domain | upd9[.]com | |
| domain | upd5[.]pro | |
| domain | antispam3[.]com | |
| domain | antispam2[.]com | |
| sha256 | 71d50b74f81d27feefbc2bc0f631b0ed7fcdf88b1abbd6d104e66638993786f8 | |
| sha256 | 0f9156f91c387e7781603ed716dcdc3f5342ece96e155115708b1662b0f9b4d0 | |
| sha256 | 1ad05a4a849d7ed09e2efb38f5424523651baf3326b5f95e05f6726f564ccc30 | |
| sha256 | 93058bd5fe5f046e298e1d3655274ae4c08f07a8b6876e61629ae4a0b510a2f7 | |
| sha256 | 1cb1864314262e71de1565e198193877ef83e98823a7da81eb3d59894b5a4cfb | |
| sha256 | 3b7e06f1ccaa207dc331afd6f91e284fec4b826c3c427dffd0432fdc48d55176 | |
| sha256 | db34e255aa4d9f4e54461571469b9dd53e49feed3d238b6cfb49082de0afb1e4 | |
| sha256 | ef28a572cda7319047fbc918d60f71c124a038cd18a02000c7ab413677c5c161 |
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
- Threat actors misusing Quick Assist in social engineering attacks leading to ransomware
- #StopRansomware: Black Basta (AA24-131A)
- ReliaQuest Uncovers New Black Basta Social Engineering Technique
- Black Basta Ransomware Campaign Drops Zbot, DarkGate, & Custom Malware
- BlackBasta_SocialEngineering_IOCs.txt (Rapid7 Labs IOC file)
- Sophos MDR tracks two ransomware campaigns using 'email bombing,' Microsoft Teams 'vishing'
Notes
- Actor: Storm-1811 (attribution: Microsoft Threat Intelligence; basis: Microsoft's own incident observations, 15 May 2024). CISA/FBI attribute the same chain to Black Basta affiliates (AA24-131A, update of 8 Nov 2024). ReliaQuest attributes its cases to Black Basta with high confidence (domain patterns, Cobalt Strike configurations).
- Sophos says its STAC5777 cluster overlaps with Storm-1811. That is an overlap statement, not an attribution. Sophos's STAC5143 copies the playbook and is not covered here.
- Quick Assist, AnyDesk and Microsoft Teams are legitimate software and are not malware. The hashes above are attacker payloads only.
- first_seen is Microsoft's 'since mid-April 2024'. last_seen is the Rapid7 report date. Sophos's page shows no date; 21 Jan 2025 is from its URL path.
- Later activity with the same entry pattern is tracked separately as an unattributed entry (teams-helpdesk-impersonation-quick-assist-2026), from Microsoft reports of 2 Sep and 30 Oct 2026. Microsoft names no actor and does not attribute it to Storm-1811, so it is not merged here.
- Eight curated hashes, all verified byte-exact against the raw vendor pages on 16 Nov 2026: five from Microsoft (15 May 2024), three from Rapid7 (4 Dec 2024). Rapid7 prints them in uppercase; they are lowercased here to match the dataset (same hex value).
- Rapid7's GitHub IOC file (last updated 25 Nov 2024) lists 33 more sha256 for the same campaign. They are deliberately not copied here; the file is cited as a source instead. Sophos's GitHub CSV is not used, because STAC5777 is an overlap only.
- Status re-checked 16 Nov 2026 against the Microsoft and Rapid7 pages; neither reports the activity as ended, so status stays unknown.
Corrections
No corrections.
See the corrections policy. Spotted an error? Tell us.