Unattributed, 2026: a fake IT helpdesk on Teams talks staff into Quick Assist, then a Node.js implant or AD CS abuse
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Moderate confidence
- Indicators (18): CSV, JSON
- Seen to
Do this now
- Limit Teams external access and federation to an allow-list of partner domains, and review new organization-themed or helpdesk-themed tenants that contact staff
- Remove or block Quick Assist where it isn't used, and allow only your approved remote support tool by application control
- Tell staff to verify any unsolicited IT contact through a known internal channel before a call, screen share or remote session, and never to read out a Quick Assist code or approve 'request control' for an unsolicited caller
- Harden AD CS against ESC1 and ESC8 (Microsoft KB5005413) by removing requester-supplied subject names on authentication templates, removing unneeded Web Enrollment endpoints, and enforcing HTTPS with Extended Protection for Authentication
- Restrict WinRM (TCP 5985) to management workstations, and alert on Node.js, Bun or Java running scripts from AppData right after a remote support session
- If you find this chain, revoke any certificate issued to the attacker, review Kerberos tickets separately, rotate credentials reachable from the host, and check for identities excluded from automated containment
Indicators
For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.
- sha2569
- domain8
- other1
What happened
Someone in an external Microsoft 365 tenant messages or calls an employee on Teams as IT or the helpdesk and talks them into Quick Assist or a Teams 'request control' session. In the September 2026 cases the attacker then installed a malicious MSI that runs a JavaScript implant on a portable Node.js runtime and moved over WinRM toward domain controllers. In the October 2026 cases the attacker staged scripts on portable runtimes and abused AD CS (ESC1 or ESC8) to get certificates for privileged accounts. Microsoft did not attribute either report to an actor.
- Microsoft Teams
- Microsoft 365
- Windows
Attack chain
-
Lure
An unsolicited external Teams chat or call from someone posing as IT or the helpdesk, under themes such as 'Microsoft Security Update', 'Spam Filter Update', 'Account Verification' or stopping an account deactivation, sometimes with a voice call so the instructions never appear in the chat
First seen
-
Artifact
The employee opens Quick Assist and reads back the connection code, or approves a 'request control' prompt during a Teams screen share, and hands interactive control of the device to the caller
Legitimate software
Quick Assist and Microsoft Teams are legitimate software and are not malware. In this campaign the attacker talked the victim into using them; the malicious part is the session the victim granted and what the attacker installed afterwards.
-
Actor
No source we cite attributes this activity to an actor.
-
Infrastructure
- External Microsoft 365 tenants with organization-themed onmicrosoft names and support-themed display names
- Azure Blob Storage accounts hosting the MSI loader
- Azure cloudapp C2 hosts, with dormant code to read an updated C2 URL from an Ethereum smart contract
- An external SFTP destination used for data theft
Last seen
What the attacker installed afterwards
Update-themed MSI loader (devfix, Hotfix) installed silently with msiexec (Microsoft, 2 Sep 2026)Loader
4cfdcae6dd1d6d98b870c8f0654d504f2bf10479a117dc297de789c249dc389da4d145a6347e47d40b3ca48af5c6dba01bf019d0110e31a44bb70fc77d1d1676cc6d0f3f47afeba018173604e34f527e8413d3a54ffb35caed529bff49055ec5
Obfuscated JavaScript implant run by a portable Node.js runtime, HTTPS long-polling C2Backdoor
Second-stage DLLs run through rundll32 (Microsoft, 2 Sep 2026)Loader
0d2fc28af246f62f27e49207d1f64e236ad9ea029412b27877d1ae6c098e86e369e10e0cb7bb2137ebea12971adb02c662cf5543a4f8c9530812bcbf7b183a23a135fe4df18c711097e69b4f27ea32a74a955160bf2fb12da841f21866d95d87
Initial access scripts, one JavaScript and two Python, run by portable runtimes (Microsoft, 30 Oct 2026)Script
85b6c424117494d3056e88689dbc94c75e9afdb187a339714043aec0da109f17f326201269f1ee2f803ae435317507263bb6e0dbfdeb70bd1bb5446e2e46f00106c5c14f043aee3bcc5843b5f50909623d5c9a6239a7c1fba9cddad4111469e7
AD CS abuse through an ESC1 template or a PetitPotam relay to Web Enrollment (ESC8), then DCSync or PKINITOther
Rclone renamed SearchApp.exe, copying file-server data to an external SFTP destinationOther
Timeline
- First seen
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports
- Last seen
- Status checked: Status unknown
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| sha256 | 4cfdcae6dd1d6d98b870c8f0654d504f2bf10479a117dc297de789c249dc389d | |
| sha256 | a4d145a6347e47d40b3ca48af5c6dba01bf019d0110e31a44bb70fc77d1d1676 | |
| sha256 | cc6d0f3f47afeba018173604e34f527e8413d3a54ffb35caed529bff49055ec5 | |
| sha256 | 0d2fc28af246f62f27e49207d1f64e236ad9ea029412b27877d1ae6c098e86e3 | |
| sha256 | 69e10e0cb7bb2137ebea12971adb02c662cf5543a4f8c9530812bcbf7b183a23 | |
| sha256 | a135fe4df18c711097e69b4f27ea32a74a955160bf2fb12da841f21866d95d87 | |
| sha256 | 85b6c424117494d3056e88689dbc94c75e9afdb187a339714043aec0da109f17 | |
| sha256 | f326201269f1ee2f803ae435317507263bb6e0dbfdeb70bd1bb5446e2e46f001 | |
| sha256 | 06c5c14f043aee3bcc5843b5f50909623d5c9a6239a7c1fba9cddad4111469e7 | |
| domain | update1n5[.]blob[.]core[.]windows[.]net | |
| domain | update1n6[.]blob[.]core[.]windows[.]net | |
| domain | update1n7[.]blob[.]core[.]windows[.]net | |
| domain | update1n9[.]blob[.]core[.]windows[.]net | |
| domain | updatetmp[.]blob[.]core[.]windows[.]net | |
| domain | synctimes[.]australiaeast[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com | |
| domain | webwether[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com | |
| domain | dssdfvsdfvsdfvsdgbfbdvdzv[.]org | |
| other | HKCU Run value or Startup shortcut named EdgeUpdate that starts a portable Node runtime from LocalAppData |
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Notes
- Actor: none. Microsoft did not attribute this activity. The 30 Oct 2026 report says it is not attributed to a specific threat actor; the 2 Sep 2026 report names no actor.
- The pattern (external Teams helpdesk impersonation, then Quick Assist) matches the Storm-1811 entry (storm-1811-email-bomb-teams-helpdesk-quick-assist), but Microsoft does not attribute this activity to Storm-1811, and this entry is not merged with it.
- Microsoft does not link the September and October reports to each other. They are grouped here because both describe the same entry pattern; the tooling after the remote session differs between them.
- Microsoft gives no activity dates, so first_seen and last_seen are the two report dates.
- Nine sha256, extracted mechanically from the raw Microsoft pages on 16 Nov 2026: six from 2 Sep (three MSI loaders, three DLLs) and three from 30 Oct (initial access scripts). Quick Assist, Microsoft Teams, Node.js, Bun, Java, Python and Rclone are legitimate software and are not malware; no hashes are listed for them.
- The October report publishes no network indicators, and Microsoft generalized environment-specific values in both reports. The domains above are from the September report only.
- Microsoft lists a Defender alert for Teams voice phishing after mail bombing among its detections, but neither report describes email bombing in these intrusions, so it is not claimed here.
- Microsoft's 18 Apr 2026 report on cross-tenant helpdesk impersonation describes the same entry pattern with different tooling (DLL side-loading through signed apps, Level RMM, Rclone) and Microsoft does not link it to these reports, so it is not included here.
- Status re-checked 16 Nov 2026 against both Microsoft pages; neither reports the activity as ended, so status stays unknown.
Corrections
No corrections.
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