UNC6692: email bombing, then a fake helpdesk on Teams sends a "spam patch" that installs the SNOW malware suite
- Status unknownWe can't confirm whether this has been taken down. Treat it as possibly live. Status checked .
- Moderate confidence
- Indicators (10): CSV, JSON
- Seen to
Do this now
- Restrict Teams external access to allowed domains; tell staff the helpdesk never sends a 'patch' link in chat
- Block browser extensions installed from outside the managed store (extension allow-list by policy)
- Alert on AutoHotkey running from a user download folder and on headless Edge scheduled tasks
- Turn on Credential Guard and alert on LSASS memory access
Indicators
For blocklists and log searches. All values are defanged.
- domain4
- sha2566
What happened
After an email bombing campaign, UNC6692 messaged employees on Microsoft Teams as helpdesk staff offering help with the flood, and sent a link to a fake 'Mailbox Repair and Sync Utility' page. The 'local patch' it served ran an AutoHotkey script that installed a malicious Chromium extension (SNOWBELT), a tunneler (SNOWGLAZE) and a bind shell (SNOWBASIN). The intrusion moved on to credential dumping and domain controller compromise.
- Microsoft Teams
- Windows
Attack chain
-
Lure
Email flood, then a Teams message from 'helpdesk personnel' offering to help with the email volume
First seen
-
Artifact
'Microsoft Spam Filter Updates' patch from a fake mailbox repair page: an AutoHotkey script that installs the SNOWBELT browser extension, SNOWGLAZE and SNOWBASIN
Legitimate software
AutoHotkey is legitimate software and is not malware. In this campaign the attacker's malicious code installed it and set it up for the attacker; the malicious part is that code and the access it gave the attacker.
-
Actor
UNC6692
-
Infrastructure
- Payload pages and downloads on attacker-created AWS S3 buckets
- WebSocket C2 on Heroku
Last seen
What the attacker installed afterwards
SNOWGLAZE tunnelerTunnel
2fa987b9ed6ec6d09c7451abd994249dfaba1c5a7da1c22b8407c461e62f7e49
SNOWBASIN bind shellBackdoor
c8940de8cb917abe158a826a1d08f1083af517351d01642e6c7f324d0bba1eb8
SNOWBELT malicious Chromium extension (four files)Other
7f1d71e1e079f3244a69205588d504ed830d4c473747bb1b5c520634cc5a2477ca390b86793922555c84abc3b34406da2899382c617f9dcf83a74ac09dd181906e6dab993f99505646051d2772701e3c4740096ff9be63c92713bcb7fcddf9f7de200b79ad2bd9db37baeba5e4d183498d450494c71c8929433681e848c3807f
Timeline
- First seen
- Google Threat Intelligence Group (Mandiant) reports
- Last seen
- Status checked: Status unknown
Related campaigns
| Type | Value | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| domain | cloudfront-021[.]s3[.]us-west-2[.]amazonaws[.]com | |
| domain | sad4w7h913-b4a57f9c36eb[.]herokuapp[.]com | |
| domain | service-page-25144-30466-outlook[.]s3[.]us-west-2[.]amazonaws[.]com | |
| domain | service-page-11369-28315-outlook[.]s3[.]us-west-2[.]amazonaws[.]com | |
| sha256 | 2fa987b9ed6ec6d09c7451abd994249dfaba1c5a7da1c22b8407c461e62f7e49 | |
| sha256 | c8940de8cb917abe158a826a1d08f1083af517351d01642e6c7f324d0bba1eb8 | |
| sha256 | 7f1d71e1e079f3244a69205588d504ed830d4c473747bb1b5c520634cc5a2477 | |
| sha256 | ca390b86793922555c84abc3b34406da2899382c617f9dcf83a74ac09dd18190 | |
| sha256 | 6e6dab993f99505646051d2772701e3c4740096ff9be63c92713bcb7fcddf9f7 | |
| sha256 | de200b79ad2bd9db37baeba5e4d183498d450494c71c8929433681e848c3807f |
Confidence: Moderate
Strong evidence, not yet confirmed by our own analysis. See the confidence scale for what each level requires. The sources below are the evidence.
Sources
Notes
- Actor: UNC6692 (attribution: Google GTIG/Mandiant; basis: their incident response and malware analysis). GTIG links it to no other named group.
- first_seen is GTIG's 'late December 2025' email campaign; last_seen is the report date.
- AutoHotkey is a legitimate scripting tool; the malicious parts are the script and the SNOW components. Hashes are SNOWGLAZE, SNOWBASIN and four SNOWBELT extension files (background.js, dream.js, dream.html, helper.html).
- SNOWBELT is a browser extension, so this entry is also relevant to browser-extension.
- The S3 and Heroku names are attacker-created resources on shared platforms; don't block the parent services.
- The two service-page S3 bucket hostnames are from GTIG's indicator list. One hosted the phishing page and the first AutoHotkey payloads; the other received an uploaded text file. They are attacker-created buckets on a shared service.
- All six hashes verified byte-exact against the raw GTIG page on 16 Nov 2026. GTIG lists no other file hashes; its DGA seed is not a file hash.
- Status re-checked 16 Nov 2026 against the GTIG page (published 23 Apr 2026, no later update); no takedown reported, so status stays unknown.
Corrections
No corrections.
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